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14 The dynamics of knowledge
accumulation, regulation, and
appropriability in the pharma-
biotech sector: policy issues
L U I G I O R S EN I GO , G I O V ANN I DO S I ,
A ND MAR I ANA MAZZUCA TO
T
HE contributions to this book enrich from a variety of angles our
understanding of how the dynamics of knowledge affect the
dynamics of firms and industry structures. In this concluding
chapter, we discuss some associated policy implications regarding the
future of the innovation process in the pharmaceutical industry and the
institutional setup supporting it.
14.1 Institutions, industry organization, and innovation:
a bird’s-eye view
The policy debate in this arena has become extremely intense and often
bitter in recent years. The issues at stake concern an area – health care –
the importance of which for society is fundamental and rapidly increas-
ing; indeed, they are becoming crucial elements in the very definition of
notions such as welfare, justice, and democracy in the new century.
Many fundamental issues in the policy debate on the pharmaceutical
industry, however, are certainly not new. Ever since its inception the
market for drugs has been (almost) always and everywhere regulated,
albeit for different reasons and in different ways. At the same time, the
extent and the forms of the regulation have most often sparked discus-
sion and conflict. For example, considerations linked to consumer
protection led, throughout most of the twentieth century, to increas-
ingly stringent requirements for the approval of new drugs, and implied
larger and more costly clinical trials. The presence of significant inform-
ation asymmetries in the market for drugs coupled with fundamental
considerations of social and economic equity have often been used to
justify the introduction of various forms of price regulation. The emer-
gence of the welfare state and the subsequent rise of health care and
prescription drug spending have induced, first, a rapid expansion of
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demand, and then a series of cost containment policies. Developments
in legislation and in courts’ interpretations of issues concerning intel-
lectual property rights have also had significant impacts on patterns of
competition and industrial evolution. Last, but certainly not least, the
institutional setups governing the systems of fundamental scientific
research have profoundly affected the ability to discover, develop,
and commercialize new drugs.
More broadly, it is important to recognize that policies and institu-
tional design have deeply affected innovation and industry evolution,
sometimes consciously, sometimes through the unintended effects of
interventions taken for reasons by and large independent of consider-
ations related to the performance of the industry. These interventions
and the evolving institutional structures have influenced the patterns of
accumulation of competencies, the selection mechanisms, and the
incentive structures to engage in innovative activities in many different,
and sometimes indirect, ways.
Policies have also evolved. Certainly, they often display inertial
elements, embedded in and shaped by specific institutional and politi-
cal environments. However, institutions and policies have been pro-
foundly influenced by technological change – especially at times
marked by profound technological discontinuities. And they are also
deeply influenced by changes in the broader ‘‘political economy’’ of any
one country and the ideological orientation of each historical period.
For example, major technological and scientific breakthroughs, such as
the ‘‘antibiotic revolution’’ in the 1930s and the emergence of biotech-
nology in the 1980s, have substantially changed both non-market
institutions and industry dynamics. The possibility of discovering
and developing new drugs was (and is) not just an occasion for firms
to make profit. It has also changed the procedures, forms of organiza-
tion, and costs of research, as well as the attitudes of people towards
health care.
Together, the boundaries between the activities that ought to be
regulated explicitly by the public authorities or even undertaken by
them directly versus those left in the hand of profit-seeking entities
happen to be deeply influenced by the prevailing Zeitgeist on the
virtues and shortcomings of market processes, as compared to political
decision processes. Indeed, the definition of health care itself – and of
people’s medical needs – depends both on the status of scientific and
technological progress and, together, on fundamental social visions on
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the very meaning of citizenship and rights. For example, does every
citizen have the ‘‘right’’ to some form of ‘‘care’’? And, if so, up to what
limit? (We return to this question of rights in the final section of the
chapter.)
In short, technological change has been and remains dynamically
coupled with institutional and political change (more on this in
Lacetera and Orsenigo, 2002).
The ‘‘golden age’’ of the pharmaceutical industry (from the end of
WorldWar II to the 1980s) was supported by a few interrelated factors.
The explosion of public support for health-related research provided
ample technological opportunities to be exploited. Firms developed
highly effective organizational procedures for discovering, developing,
and marketing drugs, refining the so-called a ‘‘random screening’’
paradigm. The international oligopolistic core of the industry, which
is now called ‘‘big pharma,’’ came to dominate under such a learning
regime. Growing incomes sustained a fast-growing demand, which –
especially in ‘‘welfare states’’ characterized by national health care
systems (most of them in Europe) – offered a rich, ‘‘organized,’’ and
publicly regulated market for drugs.
Recently, however, this picture has been drastically transformed. As
discussed in several chapters of this book, the industry has experienced
a number of interrelated transformations in recent years.
The ‘‘molecular biology’’ revolution has fostered the emergence of a
new technological paradigm, potentially involving immense new
opportunities for innovation – which, however, have only very par-
tially materialized so far. If anything, the costs of research have been
soaring, many analysts claim partly as a consequence of tighter proce-
dures for product approval (this is indeed a matter of controversy,
which we shall touch on again below). Meanwhile, the crisis of the
welfare state – and, more generally, the explosion of public expenditure
for health – has fueled attempts to reduce public outlays in this domain.
The spreading of attitudes and legislation in favor of a tighter intel-
lectual property regime (the Bayh–Dole Act in the United States and
international TRIPS [Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights] agreements being the sharpest examples), not least in areas
traditionally characterized by more lenient appropriability conditions
(including, of course, freely accessible publicly funded scientific
research), has radically changed the conditions with which knowledge
is created, diffused, and accessed.
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Newly industrializing countries – such as India and Brazil – have
meanwhile emerged as potentially important players in the world
pharmaceutical industry, mainly but not exclusively as producers of
generics for other developing countries. As a result, the very viability of
the business model that dominated the industry in the ‘‘golden age’’ has
been called into question. At the same time, the demand for health care
and the expectations of the population are continuously rising, and the
many humanitarian catastrophes in developing countries highlight the
paramount importance of access to drugs by the world’s poor.
As already briefly mentioned in the introduction to this book, policy
prescriptions crucially depend on a few, very difficult, interpretative
issues, including:
* the impact of different patent systems upon (i) the rates and direc-
tions of innovation, and (ii) their ultimate distributive and welfare
effects;
* the trade-offs and dilemmas between the increasing costs of drugs
and health care in general, together with the need to contain public
expenditure in this field, versus the demand for (or ‘‘right’’ of) access
to drugs by the whole population in rich (and aging) countries, and
increasingly so in the poorer countries as well.
The price of drugs is, clearly, one of the crucial issues (albeit not the
only one) at stake. To what extent are free (high) prices necessary to
sustain innovative activities and the viability of the industry? And how
can high prices be reconciled with the need to make drugs accessible to
the widest possible share of the population and with the budget con-
straints of the various states?
It is worth remembering that, perhaps in different forms, these
questions have been there throughout most of the history of the indus-
try. The debate around the Kefauver Commission of the US Senate,
which around half a century ago investigated monopolistic positions in
the American industry, addressed many of these issues, in fact.
Nonetheless, the following three issues introduce some elements of
genuine novelty into the debate.
(i) The growing and more direct role of scientific knowledge in the
process of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, as a conse-
quence of the ‘‘molecular biology revolution.’’ This role is particu-
larly evident in drug discovery, but science is increasingly relevant
also in drug development, in the processes of product approval, and
in the evaluation of the post-marketing performances of drugs.
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(ii) The question marks concerning the very sustainability in the long
run of the current structure of the system of innovation and health
care provision, which simultaneously faces higher costs, higher
expectations, and tighter budget constraints.
(iii) The role of developing countries, both as producers of drugs and
as consumers in desperate need, confronted by the challenge of
increasingly difficult access to proprietary drugs.
In what follows, we briefly comment upon some of these crucial
issues. First, we touch upon the question of price and other forms of
regulation. Then, we move to IPR, in particular with regard to patents
and the exploitation of basic, publicly funded research in general and
developing countries in particular.
14.2 ‘‘Market failures’’ in the pharmaceutical industry
The market for drugs, as mentioned above, has been (almost) always
regulated, for a variety of different reasons that may easily be
accounted for both in the standard economic framework as well as in
more heterodox ones. Many of these reasons can be straightforwardly
explained on the grounds of the standard economic tools, in terms of
market failures and standard economic efficiency.1
The market for drugs is inherently characterized by information
asymmetry. Producers inevitably have ‘‘more information’’ on the
quality of drugs than consumers do. Moreover, it is the prescribing
doctor who makes the decision, but even doctors often do not know in
detail the properties of a drug, especially when it is a new one. As a
result, there are a number of arguments in favor of regulation.
(i) It is observed that much of the information available to physicians
is provided by the companies themselves. As a consequence, an
external assessment of the safety of the drug (and in many places,
starting from the early 1960s, of its efficacy) may be necessary to
prevent damage to consumers.
(ii) Given the value that users may attribute to the product, especially
in extreme cases, demand elasticity tends to be very low – even
within the same class of therapeutical products (and, of course, it
is zero across them: no one with a kidney problem would accept a
1 See also Comanor (1986), Scherer (2000), and Schweitzer and Comanor (2000)
for reviews of these issues.
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drug for headache simply because it is cheaper!). Furthermore,
most consumers are insured (privately or publicly) against at least
a part of the cost of prescription drugs, so they are only marginally
interested in drug prices. Similarly, the prescribing physicians are
not completely sensitive to prices, both because they will not pay
for the prescribed drugs and because the respect of professional
norms makes them more attentive to the safety and therapeutic
value of medicines. Despite their role of scientific experts, how-
ever, physicians’ prescribing behaviors do not seem immune to
other forces, such as advertising and brand loyalty, and seem to
follow routinized patterns. (All this, of course, is premised on the
assumption that there are no corrupting linkages between drug
producers and prescribing doctors.)
(iii) A related set of reasons for regulation refers to cost containment.
In countries with a national health service or where there is a third
payer (typically, an insurer), demand elasticity to price tends to be
lower than would otherwise have been the case. This may lead to
price increases by firms enjoying market power. Moreover, as a
consequence, the absence of any countervailing measure is likely
to lead to an explosion of public expenditures, because neither the
patients nor the physicians ultimately pay for the drugs. Thus,
governments may appropriately act as monopsonist and, through
various instruments, try to reduce (quasi-monopolistic) profits
and the maximization of drug prices.
In fact, on the supply side, the pharmaceutical industry is inher-
ently characterized by non-price competition.Many chapters in this
book elaborate on the notion that innovation is a major form of
competition in this industry. In turn, producers are attributed (tem-
porary) monopoly power through patent protection. In the absence
of such protection, profit-seeking firms – the argument goes –
would not invest in research or would underinvest as compared to
the ‘‘social optimum’’ (whatever that may mean). Indeed, pharma-
ceuticals is one of the few industries inwhich patents are considered
very important mechanisms of appropriability for the economic
outcomes of innovation. Given the existence of (even temporary)
monopoly power, (price) regulationmight therefore be justified as a
mechanism to counteract monopolistic pricing.
(iv) The pharmaceutical industry is a science-based sector, wherein
scientific knowledge plays a central role and is only in part
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appropriable. Part of the knowledge that is used to produce new
drugs is generated by and/or based on publicly funded scientific
research, in principle available to everybody through publication.
Thus, pharmaceutical companies are at least partly ‘‘subsidized’’
through publicly funded research.
(v) Advertising, wherever it is allowed, might powerfully interact
with market power. Most obviously, it might just be misleading.
In any case, it tends to generate brand loyalty effects and therefore
some positive feedback on profitabilities, which may have little to
do with innovation and the intrinsic properties of the various
drugs. In turn, both R&D expenditures and advertising involve
high fixed, sunk costs, which happen to be powerful mechanisms
sustaining oligopolistic/monopolistic positions and, together, pro-
vide ample opportunities to exploit them through ‘‘excessive’’
prices (which for our purposes here may be defined as prices in
excess of those that would have justified the search investment for
the new drug in the first place).2
(vi) Even more importantly, a fundamental argument in favor of regu-
lation is based on equity and moral considerations, and makes, to
a large extent, the analysis of market processes a social rather than
a purely economic issue. Shouldn’t everybody have access to
drugs, including (new) expensive ones? Regardless of the different
attitudes (across time and countries) towards the industry and its
regulation, the main goal of state intervention has often been to
guarantee the access to safe and (later on) efficacious drugs to the
largest possible share of the population (certainly in Europe, but to
some extent also in the United States).
The policy-maker thus faces different and possibly contrasting objec-
tives: in brief, the goal of efficacious and safe drugs, and of equity in their
availability to the population, has to match the economic incentives to
induce investment in research on newmedicines by profit-seeking actors
in so far as the latter undertake uncertain search, testing, etc.
To sum up, the question is not so much whether to regulate or not
but, rather, what kind of regulation?
2 Of course, this takes into account the rates of investment in all would-be drugs,
most of which turn out to be failures.
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14.3 Price controls and product approval regulations
During the ‘‘golden age’’ the pharmaceutical industry was subject to
rather tight forms of regulation inmost countries concerning prices and
the procedures for product approval. Different forms of price controls
were adopted in most industrialized countries, the United States and
Germany being two major noteworthy exceptions. Conversely, it was
the United States that introduced the first severe and strict regulations
for product approval with the 1962 amendments.3 Other countries
(primarily the United Kingdom) followed, but the American proce-
dures have remained among the toughest for a long time.
Since the late 1970s, however, two contrasting tendencies can be
observed. On the one hand, price regulation has increasingly been
considered an inefficient mechanism to protect consumers: the argu-
ment here is that not only do they obviously generate hostility in the
industry, they also supposedly stifle innovation and introduce distor-
tions in the market. On the other hand, the increasing need to contain
public expenditures on drugs has fostered the introduction of drastic
cost-cutting measures. The result has been a general move (quite het-
erogeneous across countries) towards the adoption of more sophisti-
cated and less invasive measures of price control, such as policies
aiming at intervening on the demand side of the market to make
patients and health providers more cost-conscious and more price-
sensitive (e.g. various forms of co-payment, and other interventions
attempting to change the behavior of providers through financial
incentives and penalties), and the development of the market for gen-
erics and systems of cost sharing such as ‘‘reference pricing.’’ However,
in some countries, notably the United States (somewhat ironically), the
arguments in favor of stronger regulation of the price of drugs are
increasingly being voiced at the center of the political debate. (Of
course, stronger regulation remains both harmful and unacceptable
whenever undertaken elsewhere – but this is another story.)
3 The Kefauver–Harris Amendment Act of 1962 introduced a proof-of-efficacy
requirement for the approval of new drugs (based on ‘‘adequate and well-controlled
trials’’) and established regulatory controls over the clinical (human) testing of
new drug candidates. As a result of these amendments, the FDA went from being
simply an evaluator of evidence and research at the end of the R&D process to an
active participant in the process itself (Grabowski and Vernon, 1983).
The pharma-biotech sector: policy issues 409
//INTEGRAS/CUP/3-PAGINATION/KAE/2-PROOFS/3B2/0521858224C14.3D – 402 – [402–431/30] 10.10.2005 8:26PM
The evidence concerning the impact of procedures for product
approval and price controls on innovativeness is ambiguous, however.
While the 1962 amendments in the United States and the related
introduction of tougher requirements for drug approval certainly
caused substantial increases in drug development costs, it is much less
well established empirically whether they were responsible for lower
rates of innovation. Indeed, Thomas (1994) has quite convincingly
argued that a less lenient regulatory environment contributed to the
take-off of the British pharmaceutical industry as compared to the
French one, by conferring an advantage on more innovative firms
and penalizing ‘‘me too’’ producers.
The evidence on price controls is far from clear. Several scholars have
suggested that in the United States, lacking price regulations, higher
profits have led to higher investment in R&D. Symmetrically, along
the same line of interpretation, many have suggested that ‘‘invasive’’
command- and control-oriented approaches are likely to generate
hostility between regulators and companies, resistance to change, and
a low propensity to innovate. Japan, Italy, and France are quoted as
examples where the imposition of tough price control mechan-
isms appears to have introduced strong disincentives to undertake
innovative strategies and favored the survival of inefficient companies,
undertaking little R&D or none at all and only marginally improving
on existing products (often exploiting the absence of product patent
protection). However, the British system of price controls, introduced
in the 1960s, does not seem to have unduly discouraged innovative
activities – possibly the opposite (Thomas, 1994). And even an industry
such as the Italian one emerged as a significant innovator in a period of
price controls and a lack of patent protection and nearly disappeared
under a more laissez-faire regime.
The bottom line, at the very least, is that there seems to be no simple
and unambiguous (let alone monotonic) relation between any single
aspect of regulation (e.g. free versus controlled prices, the toughness of
the product approval procedures, different systems of inducing cost
constraints, etc.) and the degree of innovativeness – even abstracting
from more demanding measures of collective performance that take
into account justice and equity.
Perhaps it might be more useful to think in terms of ‘‘systems of
institutional governance’’ rather than isolated policies. Specific combin-
ations of different forms of regulation and competition have, in the
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past, managed to produce particular competitive environments favor-
ing both the adoption of successful innovative strategies and their
fruitful social use.
Moreover, it is worth noting that many of these institutional
arrangements were not devised with the explicit aim of supporting
innovation, or even industrial prowess. Rather, they resulted from
different purposes – such as social policies or science policies – but
ended up bearing important consequences for the capacity and will-
ingness to innovate, sometimes after quite prolonged periods of time.
In sum, the evolution of regulatory regimes has interacted through-
out the whole history of the industry with the changes in the nature of
technological regimes and with the social perceptions of what is con-
sidered efficient, just, and fair. It often did so, to repeat, in rather
unintended ways, as the outcome of differentiated and sometimes
seemingly unrelated small-scale acts of intervention in various
domains, more often than not enacted by different agencies for differ-
ent purposes (e.g. the Department of Health, the Treasury, the
Department of Industry and Trade, etc.). In fact, one of the few robust
features of the industry is indeed the profound embeddedness of its
evolution in the institutions governing the non-profit-motivated gen-
eration of knowledge, on the one hand, and those concerned with the
public access to health care, on the other.
Given that, what does the evidence suggest on the technological and
social outcome of different regimes for the private appropriation of
technological knowledge?
14.4 The role of patents and recent changes in patenting
behavior
It is empirically well established that in pharmaceuticals – differently
from several other sectors – patents are a fundamental instrument for
protecting innovation from imitators. To recall, patents have a dual role
in the innovation process. On the one hand, they are meant to stimulate
innovation by guaranteeing the ability of innovating firms to appropriate
the rewards/profits by shielding them from imitation.On the other hand,
by forcing the patentholder to codify all the relevant information regard-
ing the new (often tacit) knowledge and tomake it public, they aremeant
to foster the eventual diffusion of the knowledge (which could otherwise
remain secret) and its actual application in the commercial domain.
The pharma-biotech sector: policy issues 411
//INTEGRAS/CUP/3-PAGINATION/KAE/2-PROOFS/3B2/0521858224C14.3D – 402 – [402–431/30] 10.10.2005 8:26PM
The possible welfare gains and losses associated with patents have
been discussed extensively in the economic literature.4 Indeed, the links
between patent protection and innovative performance look less direct
than is usually assumed. In general, the empirical evidence regarding
the relationships between the tightness of the patent regime and the rate
of innovation is surprisingly thin. Even abstracting from the intricacies
of the theoretical debate, it is worth reminding ourselves that patent
laws involve many different aspects and subtleties (e.g. the scope of
patents, the costs of litigation and the enforceability of IPR, the rules
governing the definition of priority, etc.) that are likely to have funda-
mental consequences for the actual degree and form of protection for
innovators. Furthermore, changes in the degree and in the forms of
protection from imitation for innovators are unlikely to have mono-
tonic effects on innovative efforts or, even more so, on the rates of
innovation. Putting it more bluntly, there is virtually no robust evi-
dence supporting the idea that higher expected profits translate into
higher search efforts and more frequent innovative successes. Of
course, if the expected profits are zero, most often search investments
by private agents are zero too (but not always: see the open-source
software story!). In any case, above some appropriability threshold
incentives do not seem to exert any major impact upon the rates of
innovation. Rather, the latter seem to be critically affected by the
nature of paradigm-specific technological opportunities, the character-
istics of the search space, and the capabilities of would-be inventors.
In order to illustrate this point naively, note first that strong innovat-
ing companies, active throughout the world, have historically used
instruments other than patents to extract profits from their innova-
tions, even in countries where patent protection was low. For example,
advertising, direct foreign investment, and licensing have performed as
powerful mechanisms for appropriability, especially in an era when
generic competition was not as strong as it is today.
Second, the organizational capabilities themselves developed by
the larger pharmaceutical firms have acted as a mechanism of appro-
priability. Consider, for example, the process of random screening
(discussed at length in chapter 8) – i.e. the fundamental procedure
4 Two of us discuss at greater length the issue of appropriability in Dosi, Orsenigo,
and Sylos Labini (2005), where the reader can also find the background
references.
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governing drug discovery in the era after World War II. As an organ-
izational process, random screening was anything but random. Over
time, major incumbents developed highly sophisticated processes for
carrying out mass screening programs, which required systematic
search strategies as well as the relatively rigorous handling of large
amounts of data. Since random screening capabilities were based on
organizational processes and tacit skills internal to the firm, they were
difficult for potential entrants to imitate, and thus they became a source
of first-mover advantages. In addition, under the random screening
paradigm, spillovers of knowledge between firms were relatively small,
so incumbents having a pre-existing advantage could maintain it over
time with respect to firms wishing to enter. Moreover, incumbents
relied on the law of large numbers: relatively little could be learned
from the competition, but much could be learned from large-scale
screening in-house. Each firm needed access to the appropriate infor-
mation infrastructure for its therapeutic areas (Henderson, Orsenigo,
and Pisano, 1999; Pisano, 1996), and that tended to reproduce the
advantage of incumbency.
Third, the scope and efficacy of patent protection in pharmaceuticals
has varied significantly across countries and over time. Murmann’s
(2003) comparisons of the role and effects of patent laws in the
United Kingdom and in Germany on the emerging synthetic dye indus-
try is quite revealing in this respect. The UK legislation allowed product
patents, whereas Germany had no unified patent law until 1877. The
Patent Law of that year instituted a rigorous examination by the Patent
Office before a patent would be granted, in order to define precisely the
scope of the claim. The rigor of the examination process – much
tougher compared to that in the United States and, especially, the
United Kingdom, at least until 1905 – made a patent legally much
more secure once it was granted, by reducing the risk of litigation. In
turn, this facilitated the creation of a market for patents, whereas in the
United Kingdom patents were often the object of intensive, uncertain,
and costly litigation. The German law, however, allowed only process
patents and required that they be actually applied within the country,
whereas this was not the case in the United States and – in practice – in
the United Kingdom. As Murmann argues, these features of the patent
system were very important in establishing the German dominance in
chemicals and in pharmaceuticals. The legal grant of strong product
patents early on in the history of the British and French industries
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prevented the entry of new firms and gave few companies monopoly
profits without their being forced to develop strong competitive cap-
abilities. Moreover, frequent and costly litigation over patents among
British firms further weakened both their ability and the economic
interest to search for new products. Conversely, the German system
allowed the industry – not simply individual monopolists – to grow and
to construct such capabilities, also exploiting the ample possibilities of
infringing British patents. As the German industry established itself as
the world leader in chemicals, the domestic patent regime began to act
as a reinforcing mechanism, providing further incentives to innovate –
especially as it concerned processes – and to build systematic R&D
efforts. The absence of product patent protection at home, in fact,
promoted not only the diffusion of but also, less intuitively, trade in
knowledge, contributing to the formation of an early (formal and
informal) market for technology.
It is worth noting that, while the United States has always provided
relatively strong patent protection in pharmaceuticals, many other
European countries did not offer protection for pharmaceutical pro-
ducts; as in Germany, only process technologies could be patented.
France introduced product patents in 1960, Germany in 1968,
Switzerland in 1977, and Italy and Sweden in 1978 (and Japan in 1976).
More recent experiences of changes in IPR regimes raise further
questions about the actual effectiveness of stronger or weaker patent
protection on innovativeness and industrial growth.
The United States and Japan represent two important cases where
patent legislation has been strengthened. In the United States, over the
past twenty years, extremely aggressive institutional changes in the IPR
system have been introduced. These reforms, taken together, involved
cost and time reductions in patent applications and evaluation; the
extension of patent duration for some classes of products (primarily
chemical and pharmaceutical technological classes); and encourage-
ment for non-profit research institutions to patent and market technol-
ogies developed through public funding. The Bayh–Dole Act of 1980
clearly falls into this latter category. Also, in Japan, a 1988 reform
introduced significant changes in patent laws, implying broader patent
scope coupled with an extension of the protection period for pharma-
ceutical products. In both cases, however, the evidence does not seem
to support unambiguously the hypothesis that a tighter IPR regime
automatically leads to an increase in innovative activities.
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In the case of the United States, Mowery et al. (2001) have shown
that the emergence of the ‘‘industry–university complex’’ (Kenney,
1986) and of the ‘‘entrepreneurial university’’ well pre-dates
Bayh–Dole, while depending critically on the rise of the two main
technological revolutions of the second half of the twentieth century,
namely microelectronics and, more so, biotechnology. Moreover,
Mowery et al. (2001) emphasize that much of the university patenting
activity observed after the Bayh–Dole Act stems from long-standing
characteristics – in terms of scale and structure – of the US academic
system. In a somewhat different vein, Kortum and Lerner (1997) have
investigated the reasons for the observed massive increase in the num-
ber of patents that has occurred in the United States in the preceding ten
years. Their results seem to support the so called fertile technology
hypothesis – i.e. that the strong increase in the number of patents is not
the effect of a stronger IPR regime but, rather, a consequence of a wider
set of technological opportunities, and improvements in the manage-
ment of the innovative processes.
In addition, in the case of Japan, the evidence for the actual effects of
reform on innovative efforts is quite mixed. In particular, Sakakibara
and Branstetter (2001) show that, after 1988, there has been no sub-
stantial increase in R&D efforts. The observed rise of R&D spending
actually started at the beginning of 1980 – i.e. much earlier than the
year of the reform. If anything, in 1988/9 R&D expenditures showed a
relative decline. Also, in the specific case of pharmaceuticals, the
authors do not find any significant correlation between the increase
in intellectual protection and R&D efforts.
Conversely, consider India, which is one of the few cases where there
has been a weakening of IP protection: in the last twenty years, despite
strong international political pressures, patent protection has actually
been lowered. After these reforms, a significant growth in industries
such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals is observed. Almost all the
empirical studies on the Indian case agree that a weaker IP protection
system has encouraged the development of indigenous technological
capabilities and promoted catching up (see, among others, Lanjouw,
1998; Kumar, 1998, 2002).
Obviously, strong patent laws do indeed confer an advantage to
innovators, but – the evidence seems to suggest – they are certainly
not enough to promote innovation in contexts where innovative cap-
abilities are low or missing altogether. On the other hand, weak patent
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protection might constitute a fundamental mechanism for learning and
developing domestic capabilities in laggard countries, when coupled
with a complementary emphasis on pre-production research and rea-
sonable incentive systems favoring innovative and imitative activities.
14.5 Intellectual property rights and open science
Besides the foregoing evidence (or lack of it) on the effects of IPR upon
the micro-incentives to innovate, serious worries have been raised that
the spread of an excessively permissive attitude towards the granting of
broad claims on patents might actually slow down the processes of the
diffusion and circulation of knowledge and hence the future rate of
technological advance, especially as it concerns publicly funded
research. More generally, several observers (e.g. Dasgupta and David,
1994;Merges andNelson, 1990) have argued that this trend can end up
seriously undermining the norms and rules of ‘‘open science.’’
There is little question that science has played a crucial role in open-
ing up new possibilities for major technological advances in biomedical
research, as in most other technological fields. If anything, the role
of science has been more direct and immediate in pharmaceuticals
than in most other technologies. Notwithstanding the diversities
across countries in the institutional systems governing the interactions
between scientific and technological research (see Gambardella, 1995;
Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999; Lacetera andOrsenigo, 2002;
and McKelvey, Orsenigo, and Pammolli, 2005, for a discussion cen-
tered on biomedical research), in almost all cases (the former Soviet
Union and China being notable exceptions) publicly funded science,
largely undertaken in universities and in national laboratories like
those of the NIH in the United States, appears to be complementary
to that undertaken in private corporations. And the interactions
between them have, typically, resulted in a fuzzy area at the boundaries
between public and private research.
Open science has been a fundamental component of such a system,
and it is responsible for the productive, yet serendipitous, two-way
feedback between technological innovations and scientific knowledge.
The open science (OS) paradigm (see Nelson, 2004, and David, 2004)
is based on an open, accountable scientific system involving the free
dissemination of results (via publications open to the public), peer
review, and rewards tied to recognized contributions to the communal
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scientific effort. The emphasis on serendipity – that is, the radical
unpredictability of the ultimate application of any advance in scientific
knowledge – also highlights, in terms of eventual technological fallout,
the importance of government support for fields where practical pay-
offs are less certain and direct (e.g. theoretical physics).More generally,
when scientists are not constrained (by the nature of funding, and by
patent dynamics) to produce knowledge that has direct and immediate
practical pay-offs, the chances of this serendipity are greater (Nelson,
2004). For this reason, many students of the history of science have
concluded that it is fundamental that neither the market nor the govern-
ment influence too much the areas in which scientists pursue their
quests for knowledge (Polanyi, 1967).
In the words of Nelson (2004):
[I]n all the fields of technology that have been studied in any detail, including
those where the background science is very strong, technological advance
remains an evolutionary process. Strong science makes that process more
powerful, but does not reduce the great advantages of having multiple paths
explored by a number of different actors. From this perspective, the fact that
most of scientific knowledge is open, and available through open channels
(e.g. publications), is extremely important. This enables there to be at any
time a significant number of individuals and firms who possess and can use
the scientific knowledge they need in order to compete intelligently in this
evolutionary process. The ‘‘commitarianism’’ of scientific knowledge is an
important factor contributing to its productivity in downstream efforts to
advance technology.
In turn, as David (2004) argues, such an OS system is relatively
recent and relatively fragile. It dates to the break, during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, from a system of knowledge pursuit domin-
ated by secrecy and the quest for ‘‘Nature’s secrets’’ (e.g. the medieval
and Renaissance traditions of alchemy; the medieval guilds preserving
the secrets of certain trades; and mercantile secrets on trade routes,
etc.). The new set of norms, incentives, and organizational structures
(such as the use of peer review) reinforced scientific researchers’ com-
mitments to the rapid disclosure of new knowledge, and to a painstak-
ing process that developed into the research system that we experience
now in the early twenty-first century.
It is, however, a delicate system, which remains ‘‘vulnerable to
destabilizing and potentially damaging experiments undertaken too
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casually in the pursuit of faster national economic growth or greater
military security’’ (David, 2004), or – we would add – excessive greedi-
ness in the appropriation of the returns of the knowledge quest itself
(in that, going back to the older ‘‘feudal’’ ethos).
Changes in patent laws and practices might constitute one glaring
example of those ‘‘experiments’’ threatening OS. The already mentioned
Bayh–Dole Act in the United States is possibly the best-known example
of partly unintended consequences from the reckless manipulations
of such a fragile system. To recall, the Act allowed universities
and small businesses to patent discoveries emanating from NIH-
sponsored research, and then grant exclusive licenses to drug companies.
Along with it, a series of court cases in the mid-1990s overturned
previous practices, granting patents on upstream research and signifi-
cantly extending patents’ scope, even to cases in which the practical
application of the objects had not been demonstrated (e.g. the BRCA1
gene discussed in chapter 11).
Many analyses (including chapters 10 and 11 in this book, and Dosi,
Llerena, and Sylos-Labini, 2005) warn about the dangers of these
trends. One of the problems here is that, since scientific research is
usually not the final product, by strongly enforcing patents on research
outputs one is potentially preventing the exploration of new outputs
and products based on that research (Nelson, 2004). There are, indeed,
strong reasons to conjecture that the strong enforcement (and misuse)
of patent rights can stunt future innovations.
First, bringing science into the ‘‘market’’ is likely to distort incentives
away from basic research and into specific, practical areas that promise
commercial rewards.
Second, science ‘‘proceeds most effectively and cumulatively when
those who do science are part of community where open publication
and access to research results is the norm, and rewards are tied to
recognized contributions to the communal scientific effort’’ (Nelson,
2004). But widening the scope of appropriability runs completely
counter to this principle.
Historically, the reason for not granting patents on upstream
research has been precisely that this could prevent the circulation of
basic knowledge within the community of inventors. Similarly, grant-
ing patents on objects where the practical or commercial utility has not
been proved might induce discriminatory practices that would (a)
prevent the public from benefiting from the inventions and (b) prevent
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future innovation (Arrow, 1962; Nelson 1959). There is little to
support the idea that these reasons have ceased to apply nowadays.
Other sources of worry relate to the ‘‘anticommons problem’’ (Heller
and Eisenberg, 1998), discussed in chapter 10, concerning the possi-
bility that the extension of patents into research tools will limit inno-
vation due to the numerous property right claims to separate building
blocks for some product or line of research.
Thus, critics of the current policy trends suggest that, at the very
least, one ought to enforce legally those parts of the Bayh–Dole Act that
require that knowledge that emerges from publicly funded research
remain in the hands of the public – one of the main points being that
university research must stay in the hands of the public, regardless of
whether it is patented. In fact, the Bayh–Dole Act stated that its purpose
is to ‘‘ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations . . .
are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise with-
out unduly encumbering future research and discovery’’ (Nelson,
2004). The problem is that those provisions aimed at preventing the
‘‘encumbering’’ are not enforced. Hence, to make sure that university
contribute to the ‘‘scientific commons,’’ many suggest that the lawmust
urgently be enforced fully and possibly reformed, to prevent, for exam-
ple, exclusive and narrow licensing by universities. Unfortunately, as
Nelson admits, the universities, with their new, profit-seeking goals,
have become one of the main problems.
In addition to the reform of the Bayh–Dole Act, Nelson (2004)
proposes to
(i) limit the scope of patents to those that imply ‘‘substantial
transformation’’ of the natural – as opposed to proprietary – claims
stemming just from having discovered ‘‘how nature works’’ (on
these grounds, Newton could very probably have claimed a rent on
every reference to gravitation!); and
(ii) adopt much stricter and more precise interpretations of the mean-
ing of ‘‘utility’’ and ‘‘usefulness’’ with respect to patents (see the
discussion in chapter 11).
Conversely, supporters of this ‘‘new’’ IPR regime argue that patents
on publicly funded research serve the purpose of creating markets for
knowledge. The establishment of property rights on the outcomes of
research facilitates the economic exploitation of such knowledge (in
the absence of patents, firms would not invest in R&D based on the
new discovery because everybody could have access to it) and allows an
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‘‘ordered’’ path for the exploitation of such knowledge, avoidingwaste-
ful duplication of effort. The boom in biotech companies (often
founded by university scientists) is typically cited as an example of
the effects of the ‘‘new’’ IPR regime on the commercial exploitation of
basic scientific research.
Be that as it may, notice all the same that this argument is profoundly
different from the standard argument, recalled above, that patents
represent an incentive to innovation. In fact, this incentive is not needed
in the case of publicly funded scientific research: the invention has
already been paid for (by the public) and has already been realized.
Moreover, the argument in favor of the imposition of property rights
on otherwise open science rests on a series of specific assumptions
about the mechanisms underlying the generation and economic exploi-
tation of knowledge that – as argued byMazzoleni andNelson (1998) –
make it very hard to accept them in general.
Clearly, these issues and their industrial policy implications are also
at the core of the policy controversies regarding the institutional gov-
ernance of the pharma-biotech sector. For example, what arrange-
ments ought to govern the acquisition of knowledge by profit-seeking
firms generated with public resources? What disclosure arrangements
should be made? To what degree should one adjust the boundaries
between what is publicly paid and universally available, on the one
hand, and what is privately financed and privately appropriable, on the
other?
14.6 Falling innovation rates? Fewer opportunities for
innovation? Declining propensities to undertake
long-term uncertain search?
The concerns over the future of the pharmaceutical industry stemming
from the debates on regulation and IPR are compounded by the obser-
vation that innovation in the pharmaceutical industry actually seems to
be slowing down, despite the promise of the ‘‘biotech revolution’’
(Angell, 2004; Nightingale and Martin, 2004; Economist, 2005).
Nightingale and Martin (2004) suggest that the biotechnology
‘‘revolution’’ has not, in fact, increased the observed productivity of
R&D, because of the inability of drug firms to keep pace with the
increased intrinsic complexity of the biochemical problems that inno-
vative search is addressing. Over the period 1978–2003, research
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‘‘productivity,’’ measured by the number of patents per dollar of R&D
expenditure, actually fell: R&D expenditure increased tenfold, while
patenting output increased only sevenfold. This is further corroborated
by the number of new chemical entities (a much more demanding
measure of innovativeness than patents)5 approved by the FDA in the
United States over the period 1983–2003: some increase is recorded
until the mid 1990s, followed by a sharp decline subsequently. So, in
2002, US R&D expenditures in pharmaceuticals were thirty times
greater than in the early 1980s, while roughly the same number of
drugs were approved annually (see figure 14.1). Considering that in
recent years regulations have become more relaxed and approval times
have been shortened (due to the Prescription Drug User Free Act of
1992 and the FDA Modernization Act of 1997), the fall in R&D
productivity is even more surprising.
Are these patterns due to the progressive drying out of innovation
opportunities? Arguing against this possibility, however, is the diffi-
culty of reconciling it with the novel horizons of discovery commonly
associated with the ‘‘bioengineering revolution.’’
Conversely, could these patterns be the outcome of changing direc-
tions of search by many pharmaceutical firms, increasingly favoring
5 Patents are of orders of magnitude greater than NCEs because they may well
concern new ways of delivering existing drugs or new combinations thereof, and,
even more importantly, they include potential NCEs that do not achieve FDA
approval because of failed efficacy tests, harmful side effects, etc.
Companies spend more on research, but they're
launching fewer drugs
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Figure 14.1. R&D expenditure, FDA drug approvals, and drug purchases,
1980–2000
Source: Harris (2002).
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incremental improvements on existing drug families while penalizing
more uncertain long-term search? Were this the case, a challenging
paradox could appear, with (i) private firms increasingly relying on
non-profit institutions – in primis, public labs and universities – as
long-term suppliers of novel basic science, while, at the same time,
(ii) the same supposedly non-profit institutions are increasingly meet-
ing incentives to undertake research projects with plausible down-the-
line profitability.
Of course, there are many more sophisticated interpretations that
fall between these two extremes; flagging them helps set the terms of
the debate. Are we basically talking about decreasing returns to search?
Is the lack of radical innovation typical of the mature phase of the
industry life cycle? Is it a case of private strategic myopia? Or short-
term free-riding upon past knowledge that is still untapped? Or is the
growth of search/testing costs ‘‘intrinsic’’ to the technology-driven
approach?
A complementary issue in the contemporary discussion concerns the
cost of regulation (in part mimicking a similar debate in the 1960s and
1970s) and its impact upon the observed rates for the successful intro-
duction of new products to the market (most obviously, a new drug
approved by the FDA under permissive side effect rules would not be
introduced under stricter ones, thus lowering the apparent rate of
innovation).
In the multiple controversies over all these issues, Angell (2004)
offers an interpretative benchmark on one side of the debate. Many
economists provide the opposite view. In brief, Angell (not an eco-
nomist, but a top-level practitioner in the field and a recent editor of
the New England Journal of Medicine) makes two main suggestions.
(i) The research reliance of the pharmaceutical industry is vastly over-
stated and the (corrupting) importance of its efforts on sheer market
penetration are symmetrically overlooked. For example, she points
out that in 1990 marketing expenditures in the US drug industry
were equivalent to 36 percent of sales, compared to an 11 percent
R&D allocation (subject to further caveats as to whether the ‘‘dis-
semination of knowledge’’ on a particular proprietary drug offer-
ing benefits to doctors, such as conferences located in particularly
enticing environments, should be put under the ‘‘R&D’’ heading,
as is usually the case in this industry). In this respect, note that the
ratio of R&D to marketing expenditures is, in general, of no great
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significance. It becomes more worrying whenever the outcomes of
such marketing efforts end up being paid, directly or indirectly, by
taxpayers.
(ii) While there is little doubt that there is no relation (nor should there
be) between the production costs of any particular drug and its
price, Angell – along with other critics – claims that a good deal of
the upfront search and innovation costs are actually borne by the
public sector (e.g. in the United States by NIH-funded research).
According to Angell, big pharma concentrates on ‘‘me too’’ drugs
(drugs almost identical to existing drugs – sometimes differing only in
terms of dosage – extending the monopolistic profits of the old drug
under a different name).6 Conversely, truly innovative drugs (i.e. new
molecular entities with priority ranking under FDA procedures) almost
always trace their origin back to publicly funded laboratories (either
NIH labs or publicly funded universities). More than one-third of the
drugs marketed by big pharma are either licensed from universities or
small biotech companies. And this third comprises the most innovative
element of all new marketed drugs.
Again, the issue is ultimately empirical. It would certainly be helpful
if drug producers convinced of their continuing innovativeness allowed
independent researchers to browse through their R&D investment
portfolios and their product selection strategies.
Angell’s point can easily be rephrased in terms of the threat to open
science posed by the private funding of basic research, as discussed
above. Since Bayh–Dole, it is the ‘‘market,’’ more than open scientific
priorities, that determines what type of research is pursued, and
funded, in the pharmaceutical/medical/biological fields. Given the
subtle synergies, complementarities, and overlappings of interests
between public and private research (see Nelson, 2004), the novel,
emerging institutional arrangement is likely to jeopardize not only
the openness of science (discussed above) but even the technological
productivity of science itself.
These criticisms are fiercely rebutted by the industry, and by many
economic analysts. For example, it is pointed out that R&D intensity
6 The FDA allows the approval of new drugs if they are better than a placebo, not
requiring the applicant to test the drug on an older, incumbent drug. In fact, many
new drugs differ solely in terms of dosage, yet the millions of dollars spent on
marketing make them ‘‘seem’’ new and better (Angell, 2004).
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is, in any event, much higher than in any other R&D-intensive industry
(which, under the caveats briefly listed above, is a robust fact). Given
that, a possible argument in support of the continuing ‘‘progressive-
ness’’ of the industry against the unfavorable evidence regarding inno-
vative output is in terms of the deep organizational transformation that
the pharmaceutical industry is now undergoing. Following the biotech-
nology revolution, the role of scientific, academic, research has
increased dramatically. The process by which the new – biology-
based – knowledge is absorbed and adopted has been slow and painful
for large established corporations (Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano,
1999). By the mid-1990s, however, some of them had successfully
adapted, and they have again become leading innovators (Galambos
and Sturchio, 1998). All in all, the structure of the industry has chan-
ged, with a stronger division of labor between the industry, on one side,
and academia and the biotech companies, on the other. This pheno-
menon is partly due to the fact that, given the tumultuous rate of advance
in biomedical research, no single organizational entity can survey and
control – let alone produce – technological opportunities from rela-
tively basic scientific advances all the way to final approved products.
Moreover, as noted previously, the new IPR regime has introduced
strong incentives for the creation of markets for technology and the
division of labor between large companies (specializing in the develop-
ment and marketing of drugs) and biotech companies (specializing in
drug discovery) (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001).7 And the
slowdown in innovation could result, as suggested by Nightingale and
Martin (2004), from the difficulties and the time lags involved in
mastering the new scientific and technological knowledge base.
This interpretation is intuitively in tune with the more general obser-
vation that new technological paradigms take time to establish them-
selves, and their diffusion into the economy requires concomitant
changes in the whole organizational and institutional structure of the
economy (Freeman, 1995; David, 1990). In the case of pharmaceuticals,
7 It has to be noted, however, that, while the tendency towards the division of
labour is certainly undeniable and very strong, specialization is far from complete,
especially as far as large corporations are concerned. For example, interactions
between big companies and biotech firms do not occur solely and simply via
market-mediated transactions in which the latter sell a discovery to the former.
Rather, a large fraction of these interactions take place at the preclinical stage.
See, for example, Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni (2001).
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it may well be that new products are still in the phase of infancy with
respect to their full potential uses throughout the economy (agriculture,
medicine, life science research, etc.) – as happened with electricity, cars,
and the PC, when it took almost thirty years for the new product to be
adopted by mainstream businesses and consumers (Wong, 2005).
Clearly, the foregoing alternative scenarios depend critically on
whether, and how, the biotechnology revolution will deliver its pro-
mises. But in all cases the question remains open as to whether the
traditional business model as incarnated in big pharma is still viable,
and/or what the functions are that it might perform. Can big pharma
companies continue to be crucial agents in the innovative process,
along – and interacting – with academia and biotech companies? Will
they perform the function of integrators of the different fragments of
knowledge and capabilities that are required to produce a new drug?
Or, as the division of innovative labor deepens, will they progressively
lose their innovative capacities, and even their ‘‘absorptive capacities’’ –
i.e. the ability to understand, evaluate, and absorb new, externally
created knowledge? Will the large established pharmaceutical compa-
nies become (or, as Angell suggests, remain) essentially marketing-
based organizations, the function of which is ‘‘simply’’ to conduct
clinical trials, get approval for the products, and sell them?
Yet another interpretation is the view that, in fact, biotechnology is
not a ‘‘revolution’’ by any means, but, rather, that (as suggested by
Nightingale and Martin, 2004) the stagnation, or even fall, in innova-
tive output is the outcome of an incumbent ‘‘maturity’’ of the industry
characterized by a fall in innovative opportunities – a little like the
mature phase in the life cycle of such industries as steel or automobiles
(Klepper and Simons, 1997).
As yet there are no clear-cut answers to these questions. Whatever
the answers are, though, they bear fundamental implications in terms
of policies.
14.7 Some provocative policy issues by way of a conclusion
First, note that a good deal of the debate on patents and the regulation
of drug prices boils down, from a normative point of view, to the
relationships (a) between the (actual and expected) profitabilities and
rates of investments in innovative search and (b) between the latter and
actual rates of discovery.
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Concerning point (a), to our knowledge there is no clear evidence
either way. The (cross-sectional) evidence on different firms simply
confirms their different propensities to undertake R&D – that is,
different innovation/imitation strategies amongst firms. Conversely,
over time, the observational windows are too short to infer anything
whatsoever about the strategic reactions of various firms to changes in
appropriability regimes and profitabilities (while, of course, self-
serving claims should not be taken too seriously).
Concerning point (b), let us just remark that one cannot claim at one
and the same time that the industry invests a great deal in truly inno-
vative search, that opportunities for innovation have increased due to
the biotech revolution, and that the rates of successful innovation have
actually remained stagnant or fallen (unless one claims, as is often done
by big pharma, that increasing testing requirements and increasingly
stringent selection criteria based on safety grounds are the major cause
of the observed patterns – which is, frankly, a far-fetched claim, given
that in recent years regulations have become more relaxed and
approval times have been shortened, as a result, for example, of the
Prescription Drug User Free Act of 1992 and the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997).
Clearly, the outcome of such controversies entails big economic
stakes. For example, if much of the search and preclinical test discovery
occurs ‘‘upstream,’’ within non-profit, publicly funded institutions,
the argument in favor ofOS institutional arrangements is tremendously
strengthened. Conversely, if large corporations become specialized
in product development, approval, and marketing, one reasonable
scenario would be for non-profit, mostly public, agencies to move
downstream one step further into clinical trials. What would the
economic arguments be for and against having pharmaceutical com-
panies mainly producing and distributing drugs, as they already largely
do in the case of vaccines, on (quasi-)marginal cost rules? Why not
have the whole range of search/development/screening/testing activ-
ities in the hands of non-profit organizations or ad hoc subcontractors
thereof, given that the public, one way or another, pays for it in
any case?
Second, let us end with an even broader and more provocative
suggestion, concerning the very notion of ‘‘universal rights’’ for decent
health care. In this respect, the notion of ‘‘market failures’’ misses,
perhaps, a fundamental dimension of the problem. Should public
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support for scientific research be justified (or criticized) only in terms of
a market outcome? And is therapeutical knowledge only a ‘‘public
good’’ – i.e. non-rival in nature and freely accessible at zero cost? In
all probability, most would consider health to be a value in itself, for
individuals and for society as a whole, at least at a ‘‘minimum and
decent’’ level. If so, what should that level be, in so far as it is constantly
redefined by the interaction between technological opportunities,
expectations, and perceptions of what is right and wrong, as well as
its costs? Consider an extreme but revealing example. Should one
define the access to drugs and treatment for HIV/AIDS by people in
Africa as a public good? This sounds genuinely awkward. Many of us
would rather consider it a basic human right.
In economics, the concept of human rights looks much like an
oxymoron: something that is (should be) priceless, but costly. The
‘‘economics of human rights’’ is a vast and unexplored field of analysis.
However, in all likelihood, it is going to be quite different from the
standard analysis of public goods. A good starting point might be the
observation that ‘‘goods’’ such as education, defense, environmental
preservation, etc. should be funded and supported by the state because
of their sheer importance to the social fabric and government’s respon-
sibility towards its citizens – i.e. societal ‘‘values’’ as to what is right or
wrong, justice, fairness, etc. – rather than the state’s role simply being
one of fixing ‘‘market failures’’ (Nelson, 2004).
There are sound reasons to believe that science and the preservation
of an ‘‘open’’ and accountable scientific system, based on the wide-
spread dissemination of results, also fall into the category of universal
entitlements in their own right, precisely because open science is
grounded in values that go beyond their immediate practical and
economic function, and is part of the ‘‘vital infrastructure’’ of society
and hence the ‘‘responsibility’’ of society and the state.
Seen from this angle, one certainly continues to face all the economic
and organizational issues insightfully addressed in many chapters of
this volume concerning topics such as incentive compatibilities, organ-
izational learning, and the strategic management of innovation.
However, from a normative point of view, the division of labor
between an OS system of scientific and technological discovery, on
the one hand, and private profit-seeking actors, on the other, ought to
be assessed under the criteria not just of economic viability but also of
social ‘‘rights of access.’’
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Moreover, it is certainly misleading to think that ‘‘production’’ and
‘‘distribution’’ can be delinked. Pushing it to the caricatural extreme, it
would be like saying that one could innocently privatize the exercise of
criminal justice, with public authorities able to influence the access to
fair (and expensive) producers simply by paying for private sheriffs.
Rather, we are currently witnessing a period of profound institutional
transformation wherein the capabilities to generate new therapeutical
advances are coevolving with the distribution of their costs, the ensuing
rents – all with profound effects on the very structure of the social fabric.
If this book has contributed, even if only marginally, to the under-
standing of such dynamics, we would consider it a significant success.
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